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TOWARD DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN OFFSHORE NATURAL RESOURCES
DEVELOPMENT: ICELAND AND NORWAY IN THE JAN MAYEN
by Anita L. Parlow, Esq. 1

ABSTRACT
As pressures of globalization and advances in technology accelerate, more and more remote,
coastal, and small communities are left financially stranded and disempowered. Many
communities located at the historic periphery of global markets and trade routes are, often
paradoxically, marginalized from the benefits of globalized trade, even while their more
accessible natural resources have moved far closer to the center of global markets.
The powerful political institutions of nation states combined with growing transnational
businesses are driving a combination of boosts in national economies, explosions in technology,
and fewer international restrictions on capital. This three-pronged dynamic is reshaping the
structure and impacts of an accelerating global economy, creating an international global class of
citizenry for whom borders have diminished meaning.

1

Anita L. Parlow, Esq. Mst., a Fulbright Iceland Scholar, Team Lead for the Woodrow Wilson

Polar Code Roundtable Project, and advisor, Harvard–MIT Arctic Fisheries Project. Parlow, who
has authored numerous op-eds, has advised corporate, tribal and international organization on
social and environmental risk, corporate responsibility and due diligence issues. Parlow, a
member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court, earned an advanced degree in law at
Oxford University.
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As more remote, coastal and small communities are left behind, a new generation of rights
building upon protections of the environment, Indigenous peoples, and climate is setting the
table to collectively protect entire communities, marginalized as collateral damage to the forces
of globalization.

This article draws from relevant principles of international law (UNCLOS,) national practice of
Norway, the “ Norwegian Model” and other Arctic national views to posit that the evolution of
domestic and international law is evolving in the direction of distributive justice strategies that
are focused not on individual rights, but rather on the collective rights of marginalized
communities to benefit from national policies that would protect them from the downsides of
globalization for whom global growth and interconnectedness has not yet met expectations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As pressures of globalization and advances in technology accelerate, more remote,
coastal, and small communities are left financially stranded and disempowered. 2 Many
communities located at the historic periphery of global markets and trade routes are, often
paradoxically, marginalized from the benefits of globalized trade. This being the case even
while the more accessible natural resources located near the remote, often coastal communities,
have moved closer to the center of global markets. 3 The powerful political institutions of nation
states, combined with growing transnational businesses, propel boosts in national economies as

2

Larisa Riabova, COMMUNITY VIABILITY AND WELL-BEING IN THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH, IN

GLOBALIZATION AND THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH, 119, 128 (Lassi Heininen & chris Southcott
eds., 2010). (“To ensure viability of remote communities lying at the periphery of markets,
technology networks or loss of traditional natural resources requires that the “communities
themselves are engaged in improving their own well-being.”); see also Daniel Boyd Kramer ET
AL., GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONNECTION OF REMOTE COMMUNITIES,

68 Ecological Econs.

2897 (Elsevier, 3 August 2009.)
3

RICHARD WARD, ARCTIC OPENING: OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN THE HIGH NORTH, Chatham

House. (2012),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/0412arctic.pdf; see also
The Economist, The melting north (Jun. 16, 2012) [https://perma.cc/D38Z-7U3N].
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well as technology and fewer regulatory restrictions on international restrictions on capital. 4
This three-pronged dynamic is reshaping the structure and impacts of an accelerating global
economy, creating an international global class of citizenry for whom borders have diminished
meaning. 5 Despite the proverbial “rising-tide-lifts-all-boats” promise, widening disparities
between corporate wealth and main-street has reached levels of impact, visibility, and public
opposition that can no longer be ignored. 6 Entire communities and their historic economies have
been increasingly marginalized due to the forces of globalization and the international integration
of production and markets. 7 The process of globalization has exposed deep fault lines between

4

MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION, 37-43 (2003).

5

Elias G. Carayannis et al., Globalization, Nation-States, and Global Governance, in 13

INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT BOOK SERIES (2011).
6

Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone too Far?, Institute for International Economics, 2-4

(1997). Disparities, not only economic, include dispossession from long-time local economies
inextricably tied to healthy environments, such as both subsistence hunting and fishing for daily
existence and, commercial fishing.
7

Traditional economies are utilized here in two distinct but interrelated contexts: first, traditional

subsistence economies are those protected by international law as it applies to Indigenous
peoples with specific application to subsistence, rather than commercial, hunting, fishing and
gathering. Second, traditional economies are those of any community, such as those the
automotive once supported, that was offshored or left in substantial decline due to the attraction
to low wage and cost global competitors. An appropriate practice of distributive justice would

150

those with the ability to access emerging economic conditions and those without. 8 These
disparities were recently illustrated by mass opposition rallies in the streets of Hamburg,
Germany, as world leaders arrived for the 2017 G-20 meetings. 9
Whether or not globalization continues to increase at the pace of past decades, the
trajectory of income disparities is likely to continue. 10 Global alliances of domestic and
transnational non-governmental organizations will likely follow a similar trajectory in
developing common and interlinked initiatives to produce policy and law designed to curb
globalism’s excesses. 11 Thus far, international advocacy has focused on protecting the rights of

consider both the subsidence, Indigenous, industry and wage loss situations to develop new
opportunities and different competitive advantages.
8

Rodrick, supra note 6.

9

Bill Chapell, G-20 Hamburg: Tens of Thousands Demonstrates on Summit’s Last Day, NPR

(July 8, 2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/08/536159574/g20hamburg-thousands-demonstrate-on-summits-last-day, [https://perma.cc/7MMK-3NKF]; see
also Marie E. Lowe, Localized Practices and Globalized futures: Challenges for Alaska Coastal
Community Youth, Lowe Maritime Studies (July 16, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7AH8-6HPK]
(several scholars noted, with respect to Alaska, the next generation is “caught between traditions
that no longer work and new opportunities they are not ready to grasp.”).
10

Martin Wolf, Seven Charts That Show How the Developed World is Losing its Edge, Fin.

Times (July 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6N4N-K84N].
11

William K. Tabb, Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization, 346-347 (Columbia

Univ. Press 2004).
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Indigenous peoples, environmental protections on land and sea, climate change, and labor
rights. 12 These initiatives have succeeded in placing limits on what may otherwise be considered
unrestricted global trade, given its advances in technologies, vertical integration of industries,
and highly capitalized global markets. This relatively new generation of “rights” regarding the
environment, Indigenous peoples, and climate, is setting the table to expand upon international
law to protect communities that are marginalized as an externality to the forces of globalization.
This article posits that the evolution of domestic and international law is trending in the
direction of distributive justice strategies. These evolving strategies are not focused solely on
individuals, but also for the growing number of remote, local, and coastal communities
beginning to experience a breakdown of long-standing social contracts with their governments. 13

12

See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in

International Politics, 121-163 (Cornell University Press 1998); see Martha Finnemore and
Katherine Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamic and Political Change, International
Organization, 887- 917, 895 (1998); see generally United Nations Global Compact, Leadership
of the UN Global Compact: Our CEO & Executive Director (last visited Oct. 10, 2017)
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about/governance/executive-director (U.N. Global Compact
offers a global response to the challenges of ‘social license,’ bringing the advocacy for
environment, Indigenous and climate rights into a voluntary forum designed to improve upon
and respond to community impacts).
13

BRUCE E. MOON, THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBALIZATION: STRUGGLES WITH HEGEMONY,

POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER (Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D.
Underhill eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1988) (Reprint 2005) [https://perma.cc/BD5B-GTQG].
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Additionally, this article describes the legal architecture in international law that provides a
foundation for the global justice discourse as it builds toward a consensus that rights and
protections be extended to entire communities, once vibrant and thriving, now vulnerable and
often impoverished by globalization’s considerable forces. 14 Finally, the article reflects upon
Norway, a nation that has operationalized the language of distributive justice through its
Sovereign Wealth Fund (“SWF”). 15
II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

For purposes of this article, the concept of distributive justice builds upon, yet is quite
distinct from, the special legal protections or restorations evident in the growing network of
treaties, conventions, statutes, and bilateral agreements designed to restore, prevent, or stop
negative impacts on the environment and individuals. Distributive justice seeks to correct by
international law the colonization of Indigenous peoples and the degradation of marine and
terrestrial environments, or to reverse the minimal legal, environmental or social constraints

14

CHRIS ARMSTRONG, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: AN EGALITARIAN THEORY 36-74

(Oxford Univ. Press 2017); see also RYSZARD M. CZARNY, A MODERN NORDIC SAGA: POLITICS,
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 30-31, 79 (2017) (ebook) (“Among the most important operational
sources of the Nordic cooperation model, one could list constitutional tradition, citizen
movement activity and civil society … If we combine all these with diligent work and
entrepreneurship, we should obtain the constitutive features of a social construct…”).
15

The SWF distributes investment gains from its offshore oil revenues. It is significant that

Norway’s distributive approach evolved not in response to external pressures, but rather a deeply
rooted national concept of governmental responsibility to its citizenry.
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historically placed on business activity. 16 In these instances, the rationale for distributive justice
is somewhat restorative, yet more anticipatory, given the global trends that continue to
marginalize Indigenous communities while stimulating a rebuild of their community economy
which, in turn, alters their community identity. 17 Given that governments both regulate and
financially benefit from globalizing trade and markets, equity would appear to require a
distributive policy in domestic law rather than find acceptable the collateral damage to once
thriving, remote, and coastal communities. 18 This article raises the question of the responsibility
of sovereign governments to correct the imbalances.
A. Procedure and Substance
Distributive justice has both procedural and substantive dimensions. It is the view of this
article that distributive justice is based more on the quality and equity of the procedure rather
than on specific outcomes. Although influenced by international law, distributive justice is also
tailored by domestic processes to the particularities of each nation. Communities and their

16

Tabb, supra note 11.

17

ROGER HOWARD, THE ARCTIV GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S ARCTIC

RESOURCES 82-84 (2009) (describes transformation of the coastal town of Hammerfest from
declining fishing and reindeer herding to “unrecognizable” from Snoehvit, or Snow White gas.).
18

Andras Miklos, Institutions In Global Distributive Justice, Edinburgh 1-2 (2013) (contrasting

state-based obligations to its citizenries with concepts of distributive justice as a global
obligation); see also The Many Concepts of Social Justice In European Private Law 180 (HansW. Micklitz ed. 2011) (“a sustainable society cannot accept the degree of inequality currently
being produced.”).
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citizenry who have been dispossessed of their livelihoods, marginalized, or otherwise negatively
impacted by development decisions, must view the level of national procedure as significantly
credible for those communities to sustain a belief in the equity of the government process.
Despite the specific outcomes, if the public participation procedures are perceived as
fundamentally fair, then the outcome, even if unfavorable, is likely to be perceived as acceptable.
Thus, the processes of distributive justice contain the potential to deepen democracy itself. More
inclusive processes for stakeholder input has the potential to reduce the extent of community
vulnerability.
Broad community participation in national decision-making enables the identification of
specific actions regarding national regulatory strategies and global markets that might otherwise
be unnoticed. 19 Furthermore, this level of inclusivity has the capacity to ensure that distributive
and sustainable results are achieved. With proper national and local feed-back mechanisms,
decisions can be better refined to meet changing circumstances as they unfold. For example, a
collapsed fishing community seeking to build a successful alternative economic base can more
ably convey the specific resources needed from its central government to accomplish the task.
This approach has been called a “redistribution of sovereign power” designed to curb both
corporate and government excess, or where large-scale privately owned and developed natural
resources benefit only a few. 20
III. ARCTIC CONTEXT

19

George Vasiliev, Minority Rights Activism beyond Borders, 36 J. OF POL’Y. STUD. 329, 332

(2015).
20

Id.
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This High North polar region’s primary source of income generation for each of the
Arctic nations – Canada, Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland via Denmark, and Alaska in the
United States – are natural resources, particularly oil, gas, geothermal energy development, and
commercial fishing. 21 The reason to consider distributive justice in Arctic offshore natural
resources development is twofold: (1) offshore natural resources are foundational for income
generation in the High North, and (2) the strongest examples of distributive justice worldwide
are located in the Arctic region. 22
In some Arctic nations, a paradox is unfolding amongst some rural, coastal, and remote
communities between the high expectations from the benefits of global commerce, and anxiety
about the marginalization from globalization’s economic benefits. With greater surface
warming, and melting sea ice, the Arctic region is warming twice as fast as the rest of the
planet. 23 The retreating sea-ice and warming waters have advanced often-opposing commercial

21

See Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl, Arctic Energy and Mineral Resources, Arctis Knowledge Hub

(2010) [https://perma.cc/WYW4-AHG7]; See generally LARS LINDHOLDT, THE ECONOMY OF
THE NORTH: ARCTIC NATURAL RESOURCES IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE

(Solveig Glomsrød and

Julie Aslaksen eds. 2006) [https://perma.cc/B848-YF3V].
22

CHRIS ARMSTRONG, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A EGALITARIAN THEORY 9-26 (2017).

23

Christopher Joyce, Arctic is Warming Twice as Fast as World Average, National Public Radio

(Dec. 18, 2014) [https://perma.cc/95ZV-7LCT]; see E. Carina H. Keskitalo et al., Climate
Governance in the Arctic: Introduction and Theoretical Framework, in Climate Governance in
the Arctic, 1-22 (Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo, & Nigel Bankes eds., 2009); see also
Timo Koivurova & Md. Waliul Hasanat. The Climate Policy of the Arctic Council, in Climate
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and environmental interests, such as shipping, offshore oil and gas development, 24 commercial
fishing, and the protection of marine ecosystems 25 and climate. 26 It has also elevated geopolitical
interest in the Arctic as part of the world’s foreign policy agenda. 27
The development, production, and exportation of the Arctic’s vast natural resources are
expected to increase in the near and distant future. 28 The combination of the Arctic’s substantial
offshore oil and gas deposits, projections of increased commercial shipping, the continued
growth of a vertically integrated fishing industry, and an expansion of port-to-port agreements
amongst the major ports of the nations of the North Atlantic, reflect greater Arctic-wide
integration into both the region and the global economy.

Governance in the Arctic, 51-75 (Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo, & Nigel Bankes eds.,
2009).
24

Council of Foreign Relations, The Emerging Arctic (2014) [https://perma.cc/DPS5-WJN9].

25

Hajo Eiken, Internationally Coordinated, Cooperative Arctic Marine Science during the

Fourth International Polar Year, in ARCTIC SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 285, 298 (Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Ingo Winkelmann & Katrin Tiroch eds., 2011).
26

The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,

[https://perma.cc/J4Z9-A2NY] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
27

Rob Huebert, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Power Politics and Regime Building in

the Arctic, in Polar Oceans Governance in an Era of Environmental Change, 65 (Tim Stephens
& David L. VanderZwaag eds., 2014).
28

Charles Emmerson & Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, 5

(2012).
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Despite the recent collapse of the price of oil, declining offshore oil fields on the
Norwegian shelf, the high cost of offshore oil exploration and production in the High North and
increased opposition to petroleum development, 29 new discoveries are ongoing. For example, in
the resource-rich Barents Sea – the current subject of a Greenpeace lawsuit against the
Norwegian government on climate change grounds 30 – the anticipated steady oil driven growth
in Norway’s offshore is about five times Norway’s current substantial annual production. 31
A. Growth Trajectory
Despite the considerable resources in the High North, it is not clear that all of the oil
producing states in the Arctic region will continue with their earlier growth trajectories, given the

29

Emma Wilson & Florian Stammler, Beyond Extractivism and Alternate Cosmologies: Arctic

Communities and Extractive Industries in Uncertain Times, 3 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND
SOC’Y 1 (2016) (“Where industrial activity takes place, local involvement in shaping an
industry’s ‘social license to operate’ (e.g.,might) offer a counterbalance to an ‘extractivist’
imperative, by focusing more on equitable benefit sharing and protection of local livelihoods and
the environment.”).
30

Vilhelm Carlstrøm, Greenpeace’s Historical Lawsuit Against Norway for Arctic Drilling Has

Been Approved for Court, BUSINESS INSIDER NORDIC (Feb. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9SWY2NWJ]; Writ of Summons, Greenpeace Nordic (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://www.greenpeace.org/norway/Global/norway/Arktis/Dokumenter/2016/legal_writ_english_
final_20161018.pdf.
31

Espen Erlingsen, Barents Sea: Norway’s Emerging Oil Province, OFFSHORE (Aug. 11, 2016)

[https://perma.cc/YPB8-V5SQ].

158

combination of the recent collapse in the price of oil, the high costs of Arctic development,
economic sanctions against Russia, and significant public opposition to carbon fuels. 32 However,
over the next twenty years it is anticipated that oil and gas production will grow and thrive. 33
Recent joint initiatives, such as the ongoing Norway and Russia agreement, 34 and the
projected petroleum development between Iceland and Norway, offers not only a glimpse of the
Arctic’s commercial future, but an example of an effective distributive revenue model. 35
B. Distributive Justice and Natural Resources Development

32

Peter F. Johnston, Arctic Energy Resources and Global Energy Security, 12 JOURNAL OF

MIL. AND STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 11-15 (2010); see Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Program, ASSESSMENT 2007: OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC – EFFECTS AND POTENTIAL
EFFECTS 7-2 (Carolyn Symon ed., 2010); see Reuters Staff, Norway and Russia to Step Up
Cooperation in Hunt for Arctic Oil, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/XDE6-PAQW].
33

Alex Williams ET AL., The Future of the Arctic Enterprise: Long Term Outlook and

Implications, Smith School of Enterprise and Environment University of Oxford, 28 (2011)
[https://perma.cc/6RVV-MURE].
34

See Beth Gardiner, Iceland Aims to Seize Opportunities in Oil Exploration, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct.

1, 2013) [https://perma.cc/95RZ-AR3A]; see also Ithaca Kolventi and Petoro License in the
Dreki Area Relinquished, NATIONAL ENERGY AUTHORITY (Jan. 4, 2017)[https://perma.cc/H4PCRRAK].
35

See generally Iceland Energy Policy, Laws and Regulation Handbook: Volume 1 Strategic

Information and Basic Laws (2016).
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The development of natural resources is foundational to the global citizenry and essential
to nations where energy production is a cornerstone to national economies, such as those in the
Arctic High North. 36 Arctic nations, particularly Norway, Iceland, Finland, and the State of
Alaska, are on the forefront of practice and thinking about the issues of environmental
sustainability and distributive justice. 37 In that respect, the evolution of the “Norwegian Model”
offers, perhaps, the most successful example for distributive justice. This has encouraged other
States to look to the Norwegian Model for guidance, as green shoots of distributive justice
become visible in both its national policy and Constitutional practice, particularly in the Arctic.
Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a
natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural
resources shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term
considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well. . . .
[T]he authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation of these
principles. 38

36

Lars Lindholdt, Arctic Natural Resources in a global perspective, in THE ECONOMY OF THE

NORTH 27-37 (Solveig Glomsrod & Julie Alasken eds., 2008) [https://perma.cc/33WP-WU37].
37

Edward Canuel, Sustainable Development and Natural Resources Extraction, and the Arctic:

The Road Ahead, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 31-63 (2016) [https://perma.cc/5YZT-ZJ6Z]; see Karl
Widerquist, About the Alaska Dividend, Alaska Dividend Blog (Nov. 13, 2017 12:41PM)
[https://perma.cc/DQZ2-YM62].
38

Norwegian [constitution] May 17, 1814, art. 112 (Nor.).
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The concept of private ownership of natural resources and a national distributive framework for
revenue arguably illuminates a considerable, although not unresolvable, tension between the
concepts of sovereignty, private ownership, and the democratic process. Globalization and
global integration is certainly not all negative. What is in question, given the breathtaking
velocity of the internationalization of trade, markets, and capital, is whether governments will
specifically assist the hard working, enduring communities whose citizenry finds themselves
irrelevant to global markets or lacking access to tools that would support community resiliency
and the capacity to recreate its economic life. Government regulatory support and guidance to
assist the citizenry of marginalized communities to find a future within the new economic
landscape is the cornerstone of distributive justice. 39
B. Iceland
Iceland, the small island nation located in the Arctic perimeter between the geologically
similar Norway and Greenland, arguably offers new possibilities for a distributive model. The
Icelandic government, as it engages a joint offshore petroleum development project in
cooperation with Norway, is also in the preliminary stages of considering how to allocate
revenues generated by its offshore natural resources development.

39

Iceland’s Finnafjord port inches closer, PORTSTRATEGY (Feb. 1, 2017)

[https://perma.cc/3QLN-R7MU] (Finnafjord, a coastal town on Iceland’s east coast, is seeking to
build a deep water port in advance of the Jan Mayen petroleum development project and to serve
as a port of call for the likely increase in Arctic traffic as the sea ice in the high North retreats. It
is anticipated that construction might begin as early as 2020 for a remote, coastal community to
expand its use, creating jobs and infrastructure).
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The Iceland-Norway cooperative petroleum project in the Jan Mayen region, located
within Iceland’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) waters, 40 is iconic to
Iceland’s combination of a globalizing economy, fishing community decline, along with new
possibilities for eastern port communities, proximate to the Dreki licensing region. 41
Environmental protections at the highest levels, and, possibly, a Norwegian-style
Sovereign Wealth Fund has opened questions of what an Icelandic distributive strategy might
look like and, what national conceptual framework and legislative gaps are needed to achieve it.
Optimistic estimates ranging from 1 – 10 billion barrels of oil equivalent (“BOE”) in projected
petroleum development in the Iceland-Norway joint development area, the Dreki license in the

40

See GUDNI TH JOHANNESSON, TROUBLED WATER: COD WAR FISHING DISPUTES AND BRITAIN’S

FIGHT FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS, 1948-1969 (2007); ANDREW WELCH, THE ROYAL
NAVY IN THE COD WARS (2006).
41

Finnafjord, located on Iceland’s north-east coast, is being revitalized by a public-private

community-municipality-investor port project that will serve as a base-port for the projected
offshore oil and gas, serve as a hub-port for trans-Arctic shipping and serve as a service and
search and rescue port. The support for this deep-water port project at the national level, with its
emergence from the municipality level, offers a world class example of how local and national
governments along with private industry can revive and recreate a local economy in the midst of
globalization. While Finnafjorder offers a compelling story given the timeliness of the need to
build infrastructure to support offshore petroleum and shipping growth to the national growth
strategy, it offers a world class example of public-private, national-local investment strategies
that draw an otherwise marginalized community into the national and global economy.
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Jan Mayen region, 42 contains the potential to significantly boost Iceland’s revenues. 43 This has
stimulated a preliminary conversation at national and local levels regarding the Norwegian
Model and its distributive implications regarding natural resources development. 44 In this
context, green shoots of distributive justice have been unfolding since Iceland’s recovery from
the 2008 financial crash that impoverished both individuals and the state. 45
Two years after the crash, the Icelandic Parliament established a Consultative
Constitutional Assembly46 that was assigned the complex task of revising its 1944 Constitution
through a participatory national forum. While a majority of voters declared support for a key
element of the proposed Constitution that required state ownership of natural resources, skeptics

42

See generally Gudni A. Johannesson, Iceland Offshore Exploration, national Energy Authority

of Iceland [https://perma.cc/2NJR-FCUE].
43

Jichang Lulu, Billions and Billions of Barrels of CNOOC in Iceland (Feb. 18, 2014)

[https://perma.cc/WCE6-L9AS].
44

See generally Ministry Industry Report, Oil Exploration in the Dreki Area on the Jan Mayen

Ridge, NATIONAL ENERGY AUTHORITY (Mar. 2007) [https://perma.cc/Z9T6-DXBM] (Strategic
Environment Assessment of Jan Mayen Licensing Area shows the, yet unknown, but potential
extent of the resource in the offshore petroleum joint development project Iceland-Norway
offshore, the Dreki license.).
45

See The Economy of Iceland, The Central Bank of Iceland (Oct. 2016)

[https://perma.cc/3WP4-4SQE].
46

See A Proposal for a new Constitution for the Republic of Iceland, Stjournalagarad (Mar. 24,

2011) [https://perma.cc/2WH7-ENL4].
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note that adoption in the short term is unlikely, given current Parliamentary opposition. Yet, a
national movement regarding distribution of petroleum revenues 47 enjoys some degree of
support in Iceland’s remote coastal communities in the north and northwest that have been
significantly diminished to the impacts of globalization. The coastal community interest, to
reshape the meaning of recovery from economic collapse, is perhaps best reflected in Iceland’s
Draft Article 34, a tentative and perhaps unlikely part of a basis for a proposed constitution Draft
Article 34 states: “Iceland’s natural resources that are not private property shall be the joint and
perpetual property of the nation. No one can acquire the natural resources, or rights connected
thereto, as property or for permanent use and they may not be sold or pledged.” 48
Beyond the anticipated oil and gas revenues, Iceland contains the potential to offer a
bridge between relevant international legal standards, its own legal and regulatory trajectory,
implementation of the Norwegian Model, and a more strategic model for distributive justice that
creates an even more resilient democracy.

47

Thorvaldur Gylfason The Icelandic Constitutional Reform: People, Principles and Process,

Conference University Akureyri (Sept. 23-24, 2016).
48

A Proposal for a new Constitution for the Republic of Iceland (Mar. 24, 2011)

[https://perma.cc/J2BR-T3RS] (Iceland’s proposed Constitution, at Article 34, describes the
ownership of natural resources to belong in perpetuity to the nation … in the public interest.”
Further, several of Iceland’s major political parties have spoken of the “Norwegian Model” for
investment and distribution of the nation’s natural resources revenues).
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The issue of natural resource development is both personal and emotional in Iceland
where fishing is the economic centerpiece of the nation’s economy and culture. 49 The history of
Iceland's rich fishing industry offers an example of globalization, the vertical integration of
industry, and, perhaps paradoxically, what it has taken for Iceland’s commercial interests that
built a world–class fishing industry.
In part, to prevent what became substantial overfishing from domestic vessels, Iceland’s
Parliament in 1990, through its Uniform Fisheries Management Act, produced a controversial
quota system to provide protection for what counts today among the world’s most
environmentally protected fisheries. 50 In turn, those who hold the largest quotas created the
controversial yet, world class, vertically integrated, high–tech, and globalized fishing industry.
In the course of becoming a top exporter, the process, arguably, “crowded out” a significant

49

Gisli Pålsson & Agnar Helgason, FIGURING FISH AND MEASURING MEN: THE INDIVIDUAL

TRANSFERABLE QUOTA SYSTEM IN THE ICELAND ICELANDIC COD FISHERY, 117-146, OCEAN &
COASTAL MANAGEMENT (Elsevier Vol. 28 1995) (Abstract notes that the individual transferable
quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, concentrated access to fisheries on the basis of who
happened to be boat owners and catch levels during the three-year period prior to the allocations.
The ensuing public discontent and social repercussions has led to the current government
expressing an interest in exploring the Norwegian Model with respect to collection, investment
and allocation of natural resource revenues.).
50

Bradley Turner, Iceland Offers a Model for Arctic Fisheries Management, ARCTIC DEEPLY

(Dec. 9, 2016) [ https://perma.cc/5BZA-KCYL].
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number of local fishers, charged by some as leading to the collapse of the fishing communities,
many of which hark to a fishing culture and industry over a thousand years old:
The market-based quota system led to social problems, including loss of jobs,
outmigration, depopulation, a significant decrease in the value of homes and a
sense of social alienation from the capital, Reykjavik. The village lost income and
a thousand year old way of life based on fishing, diminished government support
followed for regional development and, as the fishing industry consolidated, and,
is currently situated among the world’s top ten fishing exporters, the
government’s emphasis shifted from supporting employment and small-scale
fishing industries to the increased productivity, efficiency and globalization of a
fishing industry that is now dominated by four or five major companies that
withdrew their trawlers from local villages into the capital or nearby areas. 51

An intense, national debate sprang from a core, yet controversial, quota system that limited
access and catch to protect the fisheries and marine ecosystems as well as build a sustainable
industry. Where freedom to fish for the past millennia had been the norm, communities like
Iceland’s far north and west are in collapse, as many of its fishing villages are bereft of once
prevalent trawlers and jobs. 52 However, coastal communities on the east, in close proximity to
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the Dreki licensing region, are vying at municipal levels for government support to build a deep
water port that is capable of supporting oil production and the likely increase in shipping traffic
as the waters warm and High North shipping increases.
1.

Boom and Bust Oil Cycles
Even though drilling is probably several years away, communities such as Finnafjord

prepare to build port infrastructure to support offshore oil and gas and trans-Arctic shipping.
Finnafjord’s projected port development project and Norway’s Sovereign Wealth fund’s
distributions, reflect how revenues and development policy can be shaped for local and
community benefit. 53 As the Icelandic government proceeds to support the Finnafjord project,
even as it grapples with its quandary of dispossessed, remote, coastal communities, the larger
global challenge has been described as being “poised between an old world that no longer works
and a new one struggling to be born.” 54
The Norwegian Model has engaged Iceland’s discourse both as a Constitutional matter 55
and a matter of reflection upon distribution of all of its offshore natural resources revenues. 56
The Norwegian Model offers the Iceland authorities both an effective track record on
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environment and distribution of revenues and a unique relationship of trust as Iceland moves
forward to develop its first offshore petroleum initiative. 57
IV. SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION, AND GREEN SHOOTS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Just as the Arctic region is defined by a combination of cooperation and co-existence, the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) provides a linkage
between maritime law, global justice, and trade. 58 Further, international law, as it applies to
sovereignty and jurisdiction in the world’s oceans, is directly tied to natural resources
development. The first obligation for any nation with interest in developing its natural resources,
is to confirm that it has jurisdiction over the boundaries in which the resources exist. Without
clearly identified boundaries, jurisdiction remains in doubt, and thus investments are less
likely. 59 The foundational international legal framework 60 for the procedures, authorities, and
strategies that drive norms in the world’s oceans, offers a point of departure for a sovereign’s
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right to exploit the resources within its jurisdictional waters. 61
A. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea
Referred to as the “Constitution of the Oceans,” the United Nations Convention of the
Law of the Sea emerged on December 10, 1982. Unfortunately, it was not until 1994 that the
Treaty attained the signatures of the sixty requisite parties that brought it into force, despite
hopes for universal participation. The product of the longest running negotiation in the history of
the United Nations, UNCLOS has been called a “balance” of competing interests. Its core
challenge was to balance the breadth of coastal state projections of sovereignty over adjacent
seas and oceans and, its opposite, marine power demands for freedom of the high seas.
B. Exclusive Economic Zone
The establishment of the EEZ, an establishment that extended the jurisdiction of coastal
states over waters adjacent to territorial waters, was directly connected to commercial activities,
particularly oil and gas exploration and fishing. In 1945, perhaps as a precursor to UNCLOS,
President Truman asserted the right of the United States to claim jurisdiction over the natural
resources in the continental shelf adjacent to coastal regions. 62 In 1972, Iceland, like several
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etc. This was the first major challenge to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. Other nations soon
followed suit).
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Latin American nations, established the 200 nautical mile fishing zone to demonstrate its
preferential right to fish in its coastal waters. 63 When UNCLOS later established the 200
nautical mile EEZ, called “entirely new maritime zones,” 64 coastal and littoral States were able
to enjoy the exclusive sovereign right to “explore, exploit, conserve and manage” 65 the natural
resources, living or non-living, in the seabed of its territorial waters, its subsoil and water
column. 66 However, counter arguments suggest that this new global legal framework provided
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“legal cover for a rapid resource-grab,” 67 given the twin realities of the “newly created EEZs”
combined with the right of coastal states to extend the outer continental shelves that “contains
the vast majority of the known oil and gas reserves contained under the seabed. . . .” 68
C. Common Heritage of Mankind
In the view of the skeptics, UNCLOS established a foundational international right to a
distribution of revenues generated from resources exploited in the seabed of the high seas.
Referred to as UNCLOS’ “most innovative" 69 and “most controversial” 70 and, perhaps, most
contentious Article, the oceans treaty established the principle, through its Common Heritage of
Mankind Article, 71 that the deep seabed, subsoil and its resources are beyond national
jurisdiction, and, thus not subject to national jurisdiction or appropriation. 72
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The distributive ethos established in UNCLOS Article 137 finds its roots in a speech of
given before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on January 11,
1967. The speech contemplated technological developments that were making the high seas
accessible to mining, oil, and gas production, and argued that there should be “no public or
private appropriation” of the high seas, that the high seas be used “exclusively for peaceful
purposes,” belonging to all of humankind that retains a collective right to benefit from any
development, “rather than exclusively benefit the richest states with the most advanced mining
capabilities.” 73 Specific processes and environmental standards have not yet significantly
materialized, but this speech set the next stage for distributive norms development for global
resources regimes for nation states both multilaterally and, to some extent, influencing domestic
policy. 74
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With its “Common Heritage of Mankind” proviso, UNCLOS offers a legal basis in
international law that links sovereignty, jurisdiction, state action, and a distributive philosophy
for revenues generated from natural resources development. 75 UNCLOS, particularly through
its Common Heritage of Mankind Article, raises a question of international law: should natural
resources be developed with revenues distributed to benefit a national citizenry or, to only a few
owners? 76
D. More Green Shoots: Environmental Protections and Public Participation
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The growing regulatory support for inclusion of community stakeholders in
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) has become a basis both for best practices in
environmental protections, and a process by which new issues are uncovered. 77 Over the past
forty years, the development and evolution of EIA, Strategic Environmental Assessments
(“SEA”), and Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessments (“TEIA”) advanced from
controversial frontline views to commonly held norms in both domestic and international law. 78
The EIA acknowledges the centrality of communities located in the footprint of operations to
fully understand any adverse environmental impacts, and the implications for communities
located in the footprint of operations. 79 The public participation standard for environmental
assessments in both domestic and international law offers a significant brick in the edifice of
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distributive justice to entire communities where natural resources development is concerned. The
public participation requirements reflect a greater democratization of processes where large-scale
development, particularly in the extractives sector, is proposed. 80
The globally accepted environmental norms and standards, EIA, SEA, TEIA, emerged
through external drivers visible in the form of a loose network of hundreds of interconnected
environmental advocacy groups that employed a variety of, often interlinked, policy,
organizational, and media strategies. This advocacy has moved the political needle toward
greater stakeholder input by emphasizing the soft law norms of corporate social responsibility,
stakeholder risk assessments, and social license to operate (“SLO”). 81 The combined pressures
by organized advocacy networks, litigators, scientists, and impacted communities gave rise to
these critical public participation requirements. 82
E. Indigenous Rights and Sovereignty
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Perhaps the strongest expression of participatory rights in international law is found in
the land and sovereignty rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate and consent to any form
of natural resources production on treaty, sovereign, or aboriginal lands. 83 Indigenous peoples
achieved the right to say “no” to proposed natural resources projects. The ability to say “no” to
proposed development on tribal, treaty, aboriginal, or culturally significant lands, is a critical
departure from colonial models of the past and present. 84
Somewhat like large-scale commercial interests, environmental NGOs have advocated
policies that, while designed to offer protection to the environment, marine ecosystems, or
climate, their policy prescriptions often bypass, or negate, the interests and inputs of residents of
the same Indigenous, coastal, and small communities. Participatory rights, particularly where
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natural resources are at play, are central to any meaningful approach to distributive justice. 85 The
trend in international jurisprudence toward greater public participation appears to cement not
only principles of distributive justice but also of democracy itself. 86
V. EVOLUTION OF THE NORWEGIAN MODEL

The widening demands for states to take action to protect their citizenry in a globalizing
world offers an opportunity to do better in the 21st century. One nation that demonstrates an
expansion of both principles and processes of distributive justice toward accomplishing this
daunting, yet vital, task of our globalizing era is the government and people of Norway. 87
Norway has linked its world class, oil financed, Sovereign Wealth Fund with a process of
national economic distribution that offers a distributive example that is referred to with global
respect, as “the Norwegian Model.” 88
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The Kingdom of Norway has charted a course to distribute its gains from offshore natural
resources development for the benefit of its national citizenry through a strategy that the World
Economic Forum has called “inclusive growth.” 89 The Norwegian Model is being observed with
interest worldwide, particularly by Iceland, as the nation prepares to develop offshore petroleum
in cooperation with Norway, should the petroleum exist in sufficient quantity.
It has been thirty-five years since the Iceland–Norway Conciliation Commission made its
determination regarding joint use of the Icelandic offshore, nearly fifty years since Norway
entered the world of energy exploration in its outer continental shelf, and four years since
Iceland’s Eykon Energy teamed up with China’s CNOOC to bid for a license in collaboration
with Iceland’s National Energy Authority in the offshore Dreki license of the Jan Mayen waters
located between Iceland and Norway. 90 Thus, it is an opportune moment to briefly reflect upon
the Norwegian Model as a standard-setting approach as petroleum development unfolds in the
Jan Mayen waters. 91
A. Offshore Petroleum and Social Supports
Norway, the world's third-largest exporter of natural gas and the seventh largest oil
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exporter to the global market, is considered a highly successful model of petroleum
development. 92 Revenues from the sale of oil and gas have played a vital role in the creation
and maintenance of Norway’s high levels of social, political, and economic quality of life that
count amongst the world’s best. 93
The total export value of oil, gas, and related products in 2015 was about 350 billion
Norwegian Krone (“NOK”) or about 47 percent of the total value of Norwegian goods, this
correlates to $42 billion USD. 94 Most Norwegian oil and gas is transported by a fleet of shuttle
tankers from the Norwegian shelf to European destinations, including the UK, and by large
tankers to the Mediterranean and Asia. 95
Norway’s nearly $500 billion economy is dwarfed by its $960 billion Sovereign Wealth
Fund which is financed by petroleum revenues and decades of wise investments. 96 The
petroleum industry plays a vital role in the Norwegian economy as, under Norwegian law,
petroleum revenues and taxes finance the Government Pension Fund Global, the world’s largest
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sovereign wealth fund. 97 Transfers made from the Fund support public priorities without
drawing down the Fund’s capital. 98
In 2016, about one in nine NOK spent from the fiscal budget came from the Government
Pension Fund Global, which helps to finance Norway’s extensive social support system. 99 The
long-term management perspective of Norway’s petroleum revenues is designed to ensure that
Norwegian society and future generations will benefit from Norway’s petroleum wealth. The oil
and gas sector is Norway's largest when measured in terms of value added, government
revenues, national investments, and export value. 100
In 2016, about 185,300 people in Norway, a labor force of about 2.8 million, were
directly or indirectly employed in the petroleum sector. 101 This amount is about 47,000 fewer
than in 2013, due to the collapse in the price of oil. 102 With a labor force expanding and
contracting along with the petroleum boom-bust cycle, government officials opted to maintain
patterns of production and employment with petroleum revenues, rather than changing them,
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resisting a “temptation to solve economic and political problems through increased use of oil
revenues,” 103 the epitome of the “resource curse.”
B. Socially Responsible System of Governance
North Sea petroleum was discovered in commercial quantity in the early 1960s, followed
by the enormous Ekofisk find in 1969. 104 At this point, the Norwegian government had little
knowledge of the technical and commercial practices of the oil industry. 105 However, the nation
did have significant experience with its highly effective hydropower and commercial fishing
industries. Thus, Norway entered its petroleum era with the advantage of a highly capable
system of governance combined with experience regulating other natural resources industries. 106
With its strong democratic government, well–organized trade unions, progressive
taxation policies, a relatively extensive system of social benefits, and a history of social
grievance systems, the Norwegian government was able to shape its own priorities regarding
petroleum development. 107 The Norwegian government designed a development approach that
allowed itself the time to develop an institutional capacity to produce, while exercising control
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over the production, the rate of depletion, and the extent and approach to environmental
protections.
Norway’s cautious approach allowed the government to protect its ability to maintain
freedom of action from an external industry’s timetable. The hybrid strategy that emerged—the
Norwegian Model—sought to meet its national political and economic priorities. 108 The
government opted to keep the petroleum industry under firm public control, with Statoil being
the primary instrument through which the government would implement both its oil policy and
exploitation of the resource. A primary purpose for developing a new wealth was to make
Norway a “qualitatively better society.” 109 The earliest plans included a series of social,
regional, environmental, and industrial policies to achieve this goal, through a social democratic
approach. 110
C. Paced Development
Norway created three separate entities to govern, produce, and regulate oil exploration
and production. These entities include a national oil company engaged in commercial
hydrocarbon operations, a government ministry to set policy, and a regulatory agency to provide
oversight and technical expertise. 111 This system of checks and balances helps to avoid conflicts
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of interests, allows Statoil, the national oil company, to develop commercial opportunities, while
the government agencies regulate the operators, including Statoil.
As a governance matter, an ongoing challenge for Norway is to keep Statoil from
becoming a “state within a state,” even as the national oil company has become commercially
competitive worldwide. 112 Norwegian leadership designed extraction rates so that the nation will
continue to produce well into the 21st century. As petroleum on Norway’s continental shelf
matures, new fields are becoming increasingly necessary. Norway continues to create a
corporate model that is capable of withstanding many of globalization’s anti-democratic
environmental and social pressures. 113 The combination of its regulatory and management
strategies, along with its allocation of revenues, to its meticulously attended Sovereign Wealth
Fund, intended to benefit the entire population.
Norway’s general tax on the petroleum industry was followed by a Special Tax for the
industry’s extraordinary returns on production. 114 The current ordinary company tax rate is 24
percent and the special tax rate is upwards of 54 percent. Innovations such as the Special Tax,
similar to an excess profits tax, allows for taxation policy and the Sovereign Wealth Fund to
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maintain the revenue distributions that, in part, allow remote and coastal fishing communities to
remain viable. 115
D. Challenges and Downsides
The more recent Greenpeace lawsuit against the Norwegian government for granting
licenses to energy companies to drill in the Barents Sea, suggests new legal fronts are opening
against the production of Arctic oil. 116 A core question is whether Norway’s Sovereign Wealth
Fund will continue to be funded exclusively by petroleum revenues, as the non-renewable
resource is subject not only to volatile oil prices, but a finite future. 117 Given that the small,
remote, coastal fishing villages, depend in part, upon the Sovereign Wealth Fund revenues to
sustain the local fishing industries, another question that underlies the Sovereign Wealth Fund
discourse, is whether a greater diversity of natural resources would sustain the Sovereign Wealth
Fund and make sense for the long term.
Beyond concerns regarding peak oil, or peak demand, for outer-continental shelf oil, new
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pressures are emerging from litigation. 118 As Statoil seeks new fields in joint operations on its
Russian border, Statoil is bridging the “all of the above” approach to energy development by
expanding its operations to include renewables, such as its geothermal project in Iceland’s
offshore.
Whether all nations have something to learn from this particular high North approach to
egalitarian distributions of resource revenue, or, distributive justice, remains to be seen.
However, if any two nations can make a contribution to stop the marginalizing of remote,
coastal, and small communities, it would, indeed, be Iceland and Norway, in their cooperative
venture. As perhaps the most resilient and nimble of the Arctic nations, both Iceland and
Norway share a sensibility and capability to build community-government-corporate interactive
systems that epitomize distributive justice. Iceland and Norway have ignited discussion in both
nations, and beyond, about the meaning of equitability, sustainability 119 and its corollary:
distribution of revenues 120 particularly regarding small, remote, coastal communities that depend
upon or are positioned in the midst of offshore natural resources development.
VI. CONCLUSION
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The widening responsibility of nations to take corrective action in the form of structural
changes to protect their citizenry in a globalizing world is particularly vital in the Arctic High
North. While the number of energy producing countries is growing worldwide, all eight of the
Arctic nations are significantly involved in natural resources development. International law
offers a framework of standards and norms that trend toward expanding and protecting entire
communities that have been, or will be, marginalized by the forces of globalization. However,
irrespective of the “cascade” of international standards and norms, local residents are generally
clear about their specific expectations from oil or gas projects, both in environmental, economic,
and cultural terms.
Distributive justice is not a matter of welfare, nor, of an absolute equality of distribution.
The Norwegian Model and Iceland’s deliberate, skilled, and thoughtful process to navigate,
emulate, cooperate, and break-ground, demonstrates how systemic, logical, and responsive
thinking can both anticipate and mitigate globalization’s downsides to include otherwise
vulnerable communities in its successes.
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